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Abstract
Direct competition in the electric industry does actually exist in
some cities; its impact on firm performance has been analayzed in a
number of previous studies. Control of entry into a market is an important
method regulatory commissions use to protect the monopoly status of an
existing firm, yet there have been no previous attempts to investigate
and identify the factors which ultimately influence regulatory policy
toward permitting direct competition in this industry. That is one of
the main objectives of this study.
The model specified is a logit transformation with multiple explanatory
variables. The statistical results are generally consistent with the
Stigler-Peltzman theory of regulation. The data also tend to refute the
notion that regulatory policy is an exogeneous variable which results
from ad hoc political and administrative factors. The findings suggest,
instead, that regulatory policy is a direct result of economic factors.

DETERMINANTS OF REGULATORY POLICIES TOWARD
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
Control of entry into markets is an important method
regulators use to ensure monopoly in the electric utility
industry. Though unusual, direct competition in the
electric industry does actually exist in some cities
and its impact on performance has been analyzed in a
number of different studies by Primeaux (1974,
i975b ,' 1977 ,' 1978) . However, no previous studies have
attempted to invest igate and identify the factors which
ultimately influence regulatory policy toward permitting
direct competition in this industry.
George Stigler (1971) presented a revisionist theory
of regulation which challenges the notion that regulation
is designed to serve the public interest. Stigler's
model was formalized and extended by Sam Peltzman (1S76).
Peltzman concluded that special interest groups incur
costs and realize benefits from regulation; total realized
net benefits, however, are not as great as they would
be in the absence of regulation.- Benefits accrue in. the
form of transfers of wealth and arise through control
of entry, establishment of rate structure (price fixing),
control over price and production of substitutes, and
cash payments.
This study is concerned with the use of entry control
as a manifestation of use of regulation to transfer
wealth. Using Peltzman's theory of regulation, an attempt
is made to identify factors which indicate hostility
toward competition on the part of regulators. The statis-
tical results are generally consistent with the Stigler-
Peltzman theory of regulation. The data also tend to
refute the notion that regulatory policy is an exogeneous
variable which results from ad hoc political and adminis-
trative factors. The findings suggest, instead, that
regulatory policy is a direct result of economic factors.
Regulatory Objectives
Following Peltzman's generalization (1976) of a
Stiglerian model of political wealth transfers, we assume
the regulator wants to maximize a majority M, of voters,
generated by
(1) M = n-f - (N-n) -h
where n = number of potential voters in the beneficiary
group
,
f = (net) probability that a beneficiary will
grant support
N = total number of potential voters
h = (net) probability that he who is taxed {ewery
non-n) opposes.
Although beneficiaries pay with both votes and dollars,
the productivity of the dollars to a regulator lies
in mitigation of opposition. Hence the regulator has
an ob jecti ve
f
uncti on of the form
(2) M = M(W r W 2 , ..., W n )
1
where W. = wealth of group i, and where M .>
This objective function is maximized subject
to a constraint on total wealth (V):
(3) V = Wj + w 2 + + w n = v(w 1 , w 2 , ... w n )
where V->0, but where V,
2
<0
> i.e., the total wealth
to be distributed is limited.
Among the groups vying to achieve benefits or mitigate
losses from the regulatory process are consumers of the regu
lated good, producers (both of the regulated good, and pro-
ducers of substitutes), and the regulators themselves. In
the case of electric utility regulation by PSC's, we can
specialize the majority generating function, (2) as
(4) M = M(P, n
£
, n
s
)
where P = price of electricity, n
E
= wealth of electricity
producers, and n<- = wealth of producers of substitutes
(who may be regualted by the same commission).
We assume the regulators have powers to affect the
market which result in M > , M > 0, (i.e., greater wealth
n
E
n
s
generates support) and M
p
<0 (i.e., higher electricity
rates generate opposition from residential customers,
commercial and industrial customers, and "consumer action
2groups ). If we introduce cost and demand conditions,
summarized by a profit function
(5) n = f(P,c)
where c = c(Q) = production costs as function of quantity,
the formal problem for a successful utility regulator is to
maximize the Lagrangian
(6) L = M(P,n
E
,n
s
) + x [ n- f(P,c)]
with respect to P, II-, n_ and A which yields
This is the Sti gl er-Pel tzman conclusion that the
marginal political product of a dollar of profits (Mn-» Mn<-)
must equal the marginal political product of a rate
cut (-M
p )
that also costs a dollar of profits (f
p
is
the dollar profit loss per dollar of rate reduction.)
Or, in terms of the present study of electric utility
regulation, we generate a testable hypothesis that,
through regulation of electricity rates and entry, PSC's
attempt to maximize M by balancing marginal gains to
interested groups.
Winners and Losers from Entry Control
Regulated electric utilities tend to utilize
discriminatory rate structures (Primeaux and Nelson,
1980; Hollas and Friedland, 1980). Entry control is a
necessary means of perpetuating this discrimination
because duopoly, or increased competition through entry,
would reduce the extent of the discrimination. Increased
competition reduces the ability of a firm to price dis-
criminate profitably. Residential customers are probably
the biggest losers in a discriminatory rate structure,
due to their relatively inelastic demand, consequently
they should benefit the most from competition. An impor-
tant constraint upon residential customers, in particular,
is that it may be costly to organize into a coalition
in order to exert political pressures.
However, if competition is active and the natural
monopoly theory does not hold, as reported in Primeaux
(1974), all customer groups will receive lower average
rates due to the competition. The discriminating utility
will be the only clear loser due to reduced profit poten-
tial from discrimination.
Of course, profit reduction may also originate
from other sources. Consumers of substitute fuels such
as natural gas benefit from competition for two reasons.
First, competition in the electric industry lowers electric
rates and increases competition between electric and
3gas utilities; this will directly benefit gas customers.
Second, since some gas users will then switch to elec-
tricity because of its lower price, this will tend to
reduce gas prices for those who continue to use natural
gas
.
Natural gas producers would, in general, oppose
a policy of direct competition in electricity. Natural
gas and electricity are direct substitutes for many
residential and commercial markets (e.g. electric home
heating versus natural gas heating). Because all elec-
tricity is not produced by using natural gas as a fuel,
one would expect the increase in natural gas used by
electric producers from increased competition in the
electric industry to be less than the decrease in natural
gas used by households and commercial users from lower
electric rates.
Retail natural gas utilities should also be adversely
affected by direct electric utility competition because this
would reduce the price of electricity, which is a substitute
for the natural gas which they sell. Thus commissions in
states with relatively more powerful natural gas distributors
will be less likely to encourage competi tion .
A MODEL OF REGULATORY POLICY TOWARD COMPETITION IN THE
ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
The general factors which may explain the tendency
of Public Service Commissions (PSC) to be hostile toward
competing electric utilities have been outlined in the
previous section. This section develops and tests a
model of regulatory policy toward comptition in the
electric utility industry.
The dependent variable in the model is unobserved.
It consists of an assessed probability of hostile poli-
cies toward competing utilities which lies between zero
and unity. What is actually observed is whether the
particular state PSC is hostile toward competition or
not; and the sample results in a qualitative, dichoto-
mous dependent variable, taking a value of zero or one.
The policy of the commisssion in each individual
state is classified as hostile or non-hostile toward
direct competition. The information used to classify
policies was obtained through questionnaires sent to
commissioners in May 1971. The policy was classified
as hostile if either direct competition was not permitted
legally or if the commission stated that it would not
allow competition. On the other hand, the commission
was classified as non-hostile either if the commission
does not have jurisdiction (it can not prevent competition)
or if it contends that direct competition would be allowed.
States without commissions were classified as non-hostile
toward competition. Table 1 presents a summary of the
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the classifications of regulatory policy.
The major hypothesis of this paper is that
economic variables explain costs and benefits (potential)
of regulation to the interest groups which support or
oppose entry control. A group derives power either
from their numbers or their (potential) wealth. We
now turn to a discussion of the explanatory variables
of the model .
Consumers of Electricity
The mean income of residential consumers should
be inversely related to their desire for direct competition
between electric utilities. For example, the price
elasticity of demand for electricity of a given customer
would be lower, the smaller the fraction his utility
bills are of his total budget. Lower income consumers
would probably be more concerned than high income consumers
about paying marginally higher fuel bills, because they
buy from a monopolist not facing direct competition.
Another factor which could indicate the strength
or power of consumers is whether utility regulators
are elected or appointed. Peltzman (1976, p. 215) argues
that the method of regulator selection does not make
any difference. Jack Hirshleifer (1976, p. 242) however,
maintains that it does make a difference. Whereas the
governor or state legislators which appoint a commis-
sioner may campaign on several issues in a given plat-
form, an elected commissioner will campaign on a very
narrow platform. Thus, voters elect a governor or
legislator for reasons in addition to the performance
of their commission appointees. However, elected com-
missioners are selected based upon only their regula-
tory platform. In addition to the other questions
examined, this study also tests the hypothesis that
elected officials respond more readily to constituency
pressures than appointed officials.
Value added by manufacturing fimrs ia a proxy
for wealth of industrial customers. As this measure
of wealth increases, one would expect a more favorable
PSC policy toward competition.
Gas Producers
Because electricity and gas are substitutes, natural
gas producers would not benefit from increased competition
in the electric industry (see discussion above). Therefore,
as the importance of natural gas production ri ses relative
to that of electric utilities, we would expect PSCs
to become more hostile toward competing electric utilities.
This outcome would be expected because producers of
10
substitute products for electricity prefer higher electric
prices to reduce competition with their products.
Electric Utilities
The more monopoly power an electric utility has,
the more wealth it can lose if competition takes place.
Therefore, in states where utilities currently exercise
substantial monopoly power, PSC's should be more hostile
toward competition; there is, however, a problem of
simultaneous cause and effect. Policy is certainly
affected by the power or influence of electric producers,
however, the PSC policy and attitude toward direct compe-
tition should also affect the power arid wealth of the electric
utilities. This problem is discussed in more detail
be! ow.
Empirical Results
The model specified is a logit transformation with
multiple explanatory variables of the type introduced
by M. Nerlove and S. J. Press (1973) and take'the form:
(3) P =
e
3
i
X i+ u i
1+e
6
i
X
i+ u i
which when transformed, gives
(9) In (yip) = s
i
X. + u
i
11
where P is the probability that the relevant PSC is
p
"hostile" toward competition, (In(-rrp) is the "log
of the odds" of a PSC being hostile), the X. are vectors of
explanatory variable values, and u. is an error ter m
As u. is either (1-6. X.) or (-e,X.)» u- is heterosce-
dastic, and maximum likelihood estimation of the g.
must be used.
Specifically, the model to be tested is:
(10) In(yTp-) = 6
1
(ELECTRICITY) + ^(ELECTED) +
6
3
(INCOME) + e
4
(VALUE ADDED) +
5
(NATGAS) + u
where ELECTRICITY measures the influence of electric utilities,
ELECTED, INCOME, and VALUE ADDED represent consumer
interest variables, and NATGAS represents a substitute
producer's interest variable. The nature of the variables
and data is presented in Table 2, however,- a few additional
comments on the ELECTRICITY variable may be in order.
If the ratio equals unity, then the utility is charging
the monopoly price. Consequently, a larger ratio indicates
less realized monopoly power.
Two complications arise with measurement of the
ELECTRICITY variable. First, the 1969 estimates of
this variable for residential consumers presented in
a recent article by Robert Meyer, and Leland Hayne (1980)
12
were used in the analysis. Second, simultaneous
equation bias exists because the power and strength
of the utility affects policy but the effect is not
one way only; policy also affects the power and strength
of the utility. Since data processed by equation (3)
showed a (expected) high correlation between ELECTRICITY
and the error term, an instrumental variable (IV) tech-
nique was utilized in which estimates of ELECTRICITY
were obtained by regressing ELECTRICITY on a subset
of exogenous variables.
The following analysis should clarify the technique:
(11)
and
(12)
Y
l
= 6
1
Y
2
+ e
2
Z
l
+ 3
3
Z
2
+ 6
4
Z
3
+ U
l
a
l
Y
l
+ a
2
Z
4
+ a
3
Z
5
+ V
2
whe re Y, = policy (1,0)
Y
?
= influence (power) of electric producers
Z, = influence of natural gas producers
Zp = influence of residential consumer interest
- Z 3
= influence of industrial consumer interest
etc
.
and u, and v~ are error terms.
A small increase in lt. would result in a small
increase in Y,. However, equation (12) shows that a change
in Y. results in a change in Y~- Therefore, a change
13
in u, results in a change in Y^; that is, one of the
explanatory variables and the error term are correlated
(highly correlated in this specific case). An instru-
mental variable was created to remove correlation by
regressing Y- on a subset of the exogenous, variables.
Specifically, the power of an electric utility Y
?
measured
by the ratio of residential monopoly price to actual
price, was regressed on the following exogenous variables:
number of retail establishments in 1972, 1971 state
per capita income, number of municipal electric utilities
in 1971, 1971 total revenue of municipal utilities,
1971 percent of population in SMSA areas, 1971 state
bituminous coal production per capita, and retail sales
per establishment. From this equation a predicted
value of the ratio of the residential monopoly price
to actual price, Y,,, was obtained. These estimates
of Y
2
were then substituted into equation (11) for the
log it estimation procedure.
Table 3 presents the results of the logit analysis.
The coefficients are defined as the marginal impact
on the dependent variable of a one unit change in the
explanatory variable, holding other variables constant
at mean values. Care must be taken in interpreting
the coefficients; in this case the depedent variable
pis 1n (7Tp)- To assess the effect on the probabil i ty
14
of hostile policy, P, the effect on ln(y^p) must be
solved for P. (The relationship between a unit
change in an independent variable and the value of P
is, hence nonlinear, and depends on the level of P
.
(See Footnote 9.) Column 1 presents the estimated co-
efficients and column 2 reports the t-ratios.
All coefficients have the correct sign and all
coefficients are statistically significant at the .05
level or better except for the NATGAS variable, which
is significant at about the .07 level. The Stigler-
Peltzman hypothesis that numerous groups will benefit
from regulation is generally supported, however, it
appears that elected commissioners are more likely
to favor a competitive policy. This result is at odds
with Peltzman's argument that the method of regulator
selection should be unimportant.
The estimates of the coefficients of the logit model
can be used to assess the relative influence of the in-
terested groups vying for political favor from the
commissions. Table 4 below gives the effect on the
assessed probability of a given PSC being "hostile"
toward competition, given a change in the circumstances
of interested groups. The probability is calculated
for both elected and appointed commissions. The mean
15
value of each explanatory variable, X., was inserted
in the regression equation and a predicted value of
ln(-T^T5") , and hence P, was obtained. We then changed
each expl ana tcry variable from X. to (X. + s.) where
s. is the sample standard deviation of the explanatory
variable, X., and solved for P, holding the remaining
g
explanatory variables constant at their means. The
third and fourth columns give the percentage change
in the probability of observing an anti -competi ti ve
commission, given a one- standard-deviation change in
the value of the explanatory variable. From this we
note a number of conclusions, most of which reinforce
the Stigler-Peltzman theory. The regulated industry
itself has the greatest influence on commission policies,
regardless of whether the commission is elected or appointed.
If the variable measuring the relative strength of natural
gas interests is increased, there is a significant impact
on policy in the predicted direction, and elected commissions
are significantly more sensitive than appointed 10
Large industrial users of electricity have the
third highest level of influence on commission policies
after the utilites themselves and producers of substitutes,
while the more diffuse residential consumer interest
has the least impact. The only result inconsistent
with Peltzman's predictions is the different impact
16
on elected versus appointed commission, as noted above
Summary
Statistical results from this study generally
support the Sti gl er-Pel tzman theory of regulation.
The only finding not consistent with Peltzman's formu-
lation of the theory is that elected officials are more
likely to favor pro-competitive policies than appointed
officials. Pel tzman has argued this should be an unim-
portant factor. For public policy purposes, however,
it seems that any movement toward elected regulatory
commissions would tend to foster pro-competitive policies,
at least in the short run.
Data reveal that an increase in realized monopoly
power of the utility increases the probability of hostile
PSC policies toward competition. An increase in average
value added in manufacturing and a decrease in the state's
per capita income increased the probability of favorable
PSC policies toward competition. Also, the more power-
ful are natural gas interests, the more hostile are
commission policies toward competition.
These empirical findings refute the hypothesis
that regulatory policy is somehow an exogenous variable
which results from ad hoc political and administrative
factors. Instead, it appears that regulatory policy
is a direct result of economic factors.
Table 1
Public Service Commission Policies
Toward Competition in 1971
State
Al abama
Alaska
Ari zona
Arkansas
California
Col orado
Connecticut
Del aware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryl and
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
North Carol ina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsyl vania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tenenssee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Commi ss i on Pol i
Direct Compe
cy Toward
t i t i o n
Ca teg
of
onzation
Pol icy
Wyomi ng
no pel icy
seeks to elimin
not permitted
not permitted
probably not pe
no policy
actively di scou
no jurisdiction
not permitted
no pol i cy
not permitted
not permitted
not permitted
no jurisdiction
not permitted
a 1 1 owed i n some
not permitted
no established pol
no response
not permitted
opposed to exte
no jurisdiction
competition be
municipal util
no jurisdiction
not permitted
not permitted
would allow com
considered use
North Carol ina
that municipal
systems are fr
not a 1 1 owed
not sanctioned
no response
not encouraged
legislature wou
not permitted b
util i t i e s
no regulation
not permitted
no regulation
not permitted
not permitted
not permitted
permitted if ex
is inadequate
permitted if ex
is inadequate
not permitted
ate
rmi t
rages
cases
icy
nsion of competition
over existing
tween private and
i t i e s
petition if
ful
courts have held
ly owned electric
ee to compete
or advocated
Id not permit
e tween private
non
hos
hos
hos
hos
non
hos
non
hos
non
hos
hos
hos
non
hos
non
hos
non-
hos
hos
non
non
-hostile
tile
tile
tile
tile
-hostile
tile
-hostile
tile
-hostile
tile
tile
tile
-hosti 1
e
tile
-host i 1
tile
hostile
tile d
tile
-hostile
-hos tile
lsting service
i s t i n g service
non -hostile
hostile
hostile
non-hostile
non-hostile
hostile
non-hosti 1
hostile 13
non-hostile
hostile
non-hostile
non-hosti le c
hostile
non-host ile c
hostile
hostile
hostile
non-hostile
non-hostile
hostile
a
This commission was categorized as hostile due to corr-
spondence with utility official in Hagerstown, Maryland.
This commission was categorized as hostile due to studies
by Primeaux (1975a) and Galat (1971).
c These states were categorized as non-hostile toward compe-
tition as 1) they had no state regulatory commission in
1971 and 2) we observed the existence of cities with
competing electric utilities.
Table 2
Variables Included in the Analysis
Yj - 1971 PSC policy toward competition in
. the state;
1 = hostile toward competition, = favors competition.
ELECTRICITY = 1969 ratio of the monopoly price to actul
price for residential customers.
ELECTED = method of selecting commissioners;
1 = elected, = appointed.
INCOME natural log of 1971 state per capita inc ome
VALUE ADDED = 1972 state value-added per firm in manufacturing
(in millions)
NATGAS
= 1971 ratio of cubic feet of natural gas produced
(in millions) to KWH (in millions) of electricity
sold in the state.
Sources: Y. was obtained through questionnaires mailed
by Primeaux to utility commissions; ELECTRICITY
was taken from Table 2 of Meyer and Hayne
(1980, p. 560); INCOME and VALUE ADDED are from
Statistical Abstract ; NATGAS is from Gas Facts
and Stati stical Yearbook. "~~
.Table 3
Results of Logit Analysis
ELECTED
VALUE ADDED
NATGAS
ELECTRICITY
INCOME
Coefficient
-0.933
(0.533)
-2.721
(1.213)
0.022
(0.014)
-0.112
(0.042)
1.431
(0.520)
t- ratio
1.75
2.24
1.52
2.64
2.7 5
Standard errors in parentheses
b Signif i cant at the .01 level
Significant at the .05 level
Significant at the .10 level
-Table 4
Relative Influence of Interested
Groups on Commission Policies 3
(Elected (Appointed
Mean Predicted
Probability 13
.25 9
Commercial /Industrial
.094
Electricity Consumers
(VALUE ADDED)
Natural Gas Interests .540
(NATGAS)
Residential Consumers/
. 300
Consumer Action Groups
(INCOME)
Electric Utility Interests .062
(ELECTRICITY)
Commission) %a P Commission) %aP
.471
-64% .209
103% .749
16% .521
-76% 143
-56%
5 9%
11%
-70%
Effect of a one-standard deviation increase in explanatory
variable value on P, holding other variables constant at their
means .
Mean values of continuous explanatory variables inserted in
estimated equation.
'Value of 1 inserted (if commission elected), and inserted(if commission appointed) in estimated equation.
Footnotes
differs from Peltzman's in two
i
respects
explicitly incorporate Hi rshl ei f er
' s suggestion
Our function
1 ) we
(1976) that "the regulators themselves constitute an
interest group"; and 2) we implicitly relax Peltzman's
assumption that M..=0, if j, or, "there are no inter-
group dependencies:" An example of such an interde-
pendency would be the PSC regulation of both natural
gas prices and electricity rates, when natural gas
and electricity are substitutes (in residential usage,
say) and natural gas is used as fuel for electricity
generation .
The interests of consumers and "consumer action 1
will not be, in general, identical.
groups
3. This analysis assumes that the electric and gas com-
panies are competing firms and not combination utili-
ties providing both energy services.
4. There may also be a second order effect: producers of
fuels used by the utilities may gain or lose depending
upon output effects. That is, second degree price
discrimination probably increases output, creating
additional demand for fuels such as coal, oil, and
natural gas. Output effects of third degree price
discrimination are not as clear and depend upon the
shape of the demand curve (Robinson, 1933). On the
other hand, increase competition will also increase
output due to lower prices of electricity. This also
creates increased consumption by utilities for fuels
to generate electricity.
This information was obtained through questionnaires
sent to commissioners in May 1971 (Primeaux, book
manuscript in progress). The states not included
were those which Primeaux had no responses, or all
utilities were publicly owned, or which did not have
commissions and competing utilities.
It is our intuitive feeling that Peltzman is correct
in long-run equilibrium. The observed difference in
the policies of elected versus appointed regulators
reported later in this paper may be analagous to the
(seemingly) contradictory theories of the consumption
function reconciled by Friedman's "permanent income
hypothesi s .
"
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of do!
the so
1 i t i e s
Mi neral
an IV technique, the regressors
re uncor related with u. and highly
and chosen to minimize the stan-
stimate and the covariance matrix.
this technique, see Maddala,
76-477. The following works pro-
i c a 1 Abstract, 1976 provided
shments and retail sales
dison Electric's Statistical
e da
er o 1 es tab 1
i
ions llars). E
was urce for
util i s and total
s . Yearbook
tons of bituminous coal and lignite
the number of municipal
revenue of municipal
1971 supplied number
We are indebted to Sam Peltzman for this method of
assessing "relative contribution."
pDue to the nature of the In(y^-p-) function,
(
p [1n( ^ )]
=
P ( 1 - P
)
and is not independent of
the level of P), one cannot take any single mean
p
effect of a varaible on W^rpO by itself and solve
for the mean effect of the explanatory variable on
P, the probability of a commission being hostile
toward competition. Values for allother explana-
tory variables must be included before
pAln(jTQ) can be solved for aP
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